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DUTIES OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM
TO THE PRO SE LITIGANT
MARK ANDREWS*
ABSTRACT
Alaska courts have assisted unrepresented litigants in civil cases, explaining
procedural technicalities to pro se litigants and applying more lenient
standards to pro se pleadings. Although the origin of this policy is unclear,
the Alaska Supreme Court in Breck v. Ulmer held that the trial court should
advise pro se litigants of procedural requirements and hold pro se litigants to
less stringent standards than attorneys. However, two recent cases,
Greenway v. Heathcott and Wagner v. Wagner, have complicated
Alaska’s policy by adopting different approaches regarding when a court
should advise a pro se litigant of procedural requirements. This Article
proposes that, based on the State’s recognition of a constitutional right to
represent oneself, Alaska courts apply a due process analysis to judicial duties
toward self-represented litigants to ensure that courts consistently recognize
and protect pro se litigants’ interests.

INTRODUCTION
Across the United States, an increased number of litigants have
chosen to forego attorneys and instead represent themselves in court,
particularly in civil matters. The State of Alaska has seen a similar
upward trend in pro se litigants.1 This is particularly obvious in fields
such as family law. In an estimated twenty-five percent of contested
domestic relations cases in Alaska, both parties have lawyers.2 In the
remaining seventy-five percent of cases, however, either one or both of
the parties represent themselves.3 Among domestic relations cases that
are uncontested or have post-judgment proceedings, ninety-five percent
of litigants are unrepresented.4
Copyright © 2013 by Mark Andrews.
* J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 1975. My thanks to two
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essay.
1. Katherine Alteneder, Literacy and the Courts, 24 ALASKA JUST. F. 1 (2007).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
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Since deciding Breck v. Ulmer5 in 1987, the Alaska Supreme Court
has held the pleadings of some pro se litigants to a less stringent
standard than represented parties, even finding in some cases an
affirmative duty of the trial court to explain to pro se litigants the
technical points of procedure.6 In addition to increasing access to the
courts, this policy of pro se leniency has promoted the resolution of
disputes on their merits, rather than on technical errors made by an
unrepresented party.
For twenty-five years, Breck served as a useful guidepost for
dealing with the actions of pro se litigants. Within the last year,
however, the Alaska Supreme Court has decided two cases that have
rendered this policy of leniency in Alaska less clear.7 As a result, it has
lost some of its force. Wagner v. Wagner8 and Greenway v. Heathcott9 not
only bring the applicability of the pro se leniency policy into question,
but they also create conflicting precedent in the Alaska court system.
This Article examines the question of what degree of procedural
flexibility is owed to an unrepresented civil litigant10 in Alaska trial
courts, and calls on the Alaska Supreme Court to resolve the issue to
promote a coherent, consistent, and useful policy that protects the pro se
party. First, this Article explores whether there is any grounding for the
policy of leniency outside of case law. Next, it traces and summarizes
the development of the pro se leniency policy in Alaska case law
through 2012. Finally, the Article discusses the two most recent cases,
5. 745 P.2d 66 (Alaska 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1023 (1988).
6. Id. at 75.
7. Wagner v. Wagner, 299 P.3d 170 (Alaska 2013); Greenway v. Heathcott,
294 P.3d 1056 (Alaska 2013).
8. 299 P.3d 170 (Alaska 2013).
9. 294 P.3d 1056 (Alaska 2013).
10. This Article is limited to discussing the pro se civil litigant. There is no
analysis of criminal cases or appellate procedure. Except where federal cases
affect Alaska law, federal authority is not discussed. It is worth noting that there
exists a group of cases where the accommodation granted to the pro se litigant in
a civil case is the appointment of counsel. See, e.g., In re Alaska Network on
Domestic Violence & Sexual Assault, 264 P.3d 835, 838 (Alaska 2011) (“This
emphasis on fairness and equal advantage indicates that the right to counsel
where the opposing party is represented by a public agency arises, at least in
part, from the government’s otherwise one-sided support for the party with an
attorney supplied by a public agency.”); Flores v. Flores, 598 P.2d 893 (Alaska
1979) (holding that the due process clause of State Constitution guaranteed wife,
an indigent party, the right to court-appointed counsel in a private child custody
proceeding in which her spouse was represented by Alaska legal services
corporation). By and large, in these cases, the appointment of counsel is based
on the court’s recognition of the importance of the specific substantive issues in
dispute, rather than any acknowledgment of a policy of leniency toward the pro
se litigant. These cases grant the right of counsel when one might not otherwise
be able to afford counsel, when the litigant is litigating against a public agency.
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Wagner and Greenway, and highlights the confusion and uncertainty
these decisions are likely to create.

I. THE POLICY OF PRO SE LENIENCY LACKS A CLEAR
SOURCE IN ALASKA LAW
The unrepresented litigant in Alaska receives procedural leniency,
but the initial source of such a policy is unclear. There is nothing
explicitly requiring such treatment in the Alaska Constitution, the
Alaska Statutes, the Code of Judicial Conduct, or the Rules of
Professional Conduct.
There is ample authority that the Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure
should be interpreted to promote the “just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding.”11 The trial court may
relax the Rules when “strict adherence to them would work a manifest
injustice.”12 But these Rules apply to every litigant. The Rules lack a
policy that specifically covers civil litigants who are unrepresented. Due
process protections within the United States Constitution may also
provide some basis for the policy of pro se leniency. Recently, the
United States Supreme Court held in Turner v. Rogers13 that the
Fourteenth Amendment requires state assistance to the unrepresented
civil litigant when the possible outcome includes incarceration.14 The
required state assistance sometimes, but not always, extends to
appointment of counsel.15 Even when state assistance does not go so far
as to appoint counsel, the risk of incarceration still calls for some higher
degree of due process protection. Accordingly, “the State must . . . have
in place alternative procedures that assure a fundamentally fair
determination of the critical incarceration-related question.”16
The Alaska Supreme Court has never cited Turner v. Rogers, and the
opinion does not stand for any general constitutional right to leniency in
favor of unrepresented parties. It is also, of course, narrowed by the fact
that there must be a risk of incarceration to invoke its holding.
Nonetheless, the case suggests that there is some foundation in the
Fourteenth Amendment for a policy of pro se leniency, and Alaska
courts should draw on this principle to extend due process to selfrepresentation.

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

ALASKA R. CIV. P. 1 (“Scope of Rules – Construction”).
ALASKA R. CIV. P. 94 (“Relaxation of Rules”).
131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011).
Id. at 2512.
Id. at 2518.
Id. at 2512.
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II. DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS SHOULD EXTEND TO THE
RIGHT OF SELF-REPRESENTATION
Alaska recognizes a constitutional right to represent oneself. In
McCracken v. State,17 the Alaska Supreme Court found that the right to
self-representation was among the rights retained by the people under
the Alaska Constitution.18
In McCracken, a prisoner filed a petition for writ of habeus corpus
in the Juneau Superior Court and requested to represent himself.19 The
Alaska Supreme Court held there was a right to self-representation
under the Alaska Constitution, but that the right is not absolute.20
For the Due Process Clause to apply, “an individual interest [must
be] of sufficient importance to warrant constitutional protection.”21
Following the decision in McCracken v. State, the right to represent
oneself in court should be considered one such interest and thus should
be entitled to due process protection.22 This interest is subject to the
same analysis as any other under the Due Process Clause.23 In 1977, in
City of Homer v. State,24 the Alaska Supreme Court adopted the federal
due process analysis set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge25 the previous
year.26 Mathews found that when a federal statute enacted Social Security

17. 518 P.2d 85 (Alaska 1974).
18. Id. at 91.
19. Id. at 87.
20. Id. at 91. The Court recommended a two-part test where: (1) the judge
must ascertain whether a prisoner is capable of presenting his allegations in a
rational and coherent manner, and (2) the judge must believe the prisoner
understands precisely what they are giving up by declining the assistance of
counsel. Id.
21. Matson v. State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm’n, 785 P.2d 1200,
1206 (Alaska 1990) (quoting Nichols v. Eckert, 504 P.2d 1359, 1362 (Alaska 1973))
(internal quotation mark omitted).
22. See McCracken, 518 P.2d at 91 (“The opportunity to present one’s own
position where liberty itself is at stake should not lightly be disregarded, and the
right to counsel should not be used as a bar to self-representation.”).
23. See City of Homer v. State, Dep’t of Natural Res., 566 P.2d 1314 (Alaska
1977) (applying due process analysis to a municipal corporation’s claim to
tidelands).
24. Id.
25. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
26. City of Homer, 566 P.2d at 1319 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334–35)
(“[T]he specific dictates of due process generally involve the consideration of
three distinct factors: first, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the
fiscal and administrative burdens that additional or substitute procedural
requirements would entail.”).
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benefits, the statute created a property interest protected by the due
process clause.27 In Alaska the right to self-representation is secured by
statute.28 Later, in In re Urie, the Alaska Supreme Court similarly used
the Eldridge test:
Under due process we will review the bar rule
provision [relating to admissions] by considering three
main factors: (1) the nature of the private interest
affected, (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of that
interest by the procedures used, and the probable value,
if any, of any additional or substitute procedural
safeguards, and (3) the state’s interest, including the
fiscal and administrative burdens that additional or
substitute procedural requirements would entail.29
Due process protects the right to self-representation from arbitrary
denial. It ensures a pro se litigant’s claim will be heard despite a
litigant’s potential lack of familiarity with procedure.30 Due process,
however, has its inherent limits: relaxed procedures must not deprive
the opposing party of his own rights to due process, and must preserve
the impartiality of the court.
Standing alone, the constitutional right to represent oneself is
settled in Alaska law. However, the Alaska Supreme Court has never
expanded McCracken to require a policy of leniency toward pro se
litigants under the Alaska Constitution. The right to self-representation
presents some distinct due process issues. Considerations unique to the
policy of leniency make the due process analysis more difficult than in
other scenarios. For example, other due process questions typically
involve two adverse parties, with the court as a neutral decision maker.
But as to pro se litigants, the court must also protect its role as a neutral
decision maker. The Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct, which consists of
five canons intended to establish standards for the ethical conduct of
judges, emphasizes that a judge must be mindful of judicial integrity
and must maintain the appearance of neutrality and fairness.31 All five
judicial canons of conduct deal in some way with impartiality and the
restraint on behavior that impartiality requires.32

27. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333.
28. ALASKA STAT. § 22.20.040(a) (2013).
29. In re Urie, 617 P.2d 505, 508 & n.5 (Alaska 1980).
30. See Haines v. Kerner, 92 S. Ct. 594, 596 (1972) (noting that pro se
pleadings are held to a “less stringent standard” than “formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers”). See also infra discussion Part III.
31. ALASKA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3–4 (1998).
32. ALASKA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1–5 (1998).
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The trial court sometimes has an affirmative duty to advise pro se
litigants about certain things, such as the need to include affidavits
when opposing summary judgment33 or the method by which a party
may attempt to withdraw admitted statements.34 When the trial court
gives such advice, its own neutrality may become an issue. The Alaska
Supreme Court has taken note of the trial court’s sensitive role when
giving advice to a pro se litigant, requiring trial courts to offer guidance
when doing so would not constitute “open-ended participation by the
court [that] would be difficult to contain.”35 At the same time, however,
the Alaska Supreme Court has held that step-by-step assistance to the
litigant is not permitted.36 Such help might force the judge to become the
advocate for one side.37 Additionally, when considering the affirmative
duty to advise the litigant, the court has also noted the judiciary’s own
interest in judicial efficiency.38 Providing litigants step-by-step advice
and help, in addition to prompting concerns over neutrality, also strains
judicial resources.
Another due process issue unique to pro se litigants is what role the
Rules of Civil Procedure should play. The Rules attempt to define a fair
method of procedure,39 but an unrepresented litigant seems to call for
exceptions. In effect, courts liberally interpret the Rules to the benefit of
pro se litigants. As described above, this is supported by Rule 1, which
states that courts should consider the goals of fairness, speed, and cost,40
and Rule 94, which allows the rules to be relaxed or dispensed with
when necessary.41 However, the Rules also place a premium on uniform
treatment. The Alaska Supreme Court has noted that the Rules were
promulgated for the “specific purpose of giving fair and reasonable
notice to all parties of the appropriate procedural standards that should
be uniformly applied when any party, including a pro se litigant, seeks
relief in [civil litigation].”42 Reconciling the preference for efficiency and
33. Breck v. Ulmer, 745 P.2d 66, 75 (Alaska 1987).
34. Genaro v. Municipality of Anchorage, 76 P.3d 844, 845–47 (Alaska 2003).
35. Id. at 847 n.12 (quoting Bauman v. State, Div. of Family & Youth Servs.,
768 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Alaska 1989)).
36. See Shooshanian v. Dire, 237 P.3d 618, 624 (Alaska 2010) (quoting
Bauman, 768 P.2d at 1099) (“[A] trial court is not required to ‘instruct a pro se
litigant as to each step in litigating a claim’ because such involved assistance
‘would compromise the court’s impartiality in deciding the case by forcing the
judge to act as an advocate for one side.’”).
37. Id.
38. Greenway v. Heathcott, 294 P.3d 1056, 1071 (Alaska 2013).
39. See ALASKA R. CIV. P. 1 (“These rules shall be construed to secure the
just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”).
40. Id.
41. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 94.
42. Bauman, 768 P.2d at 1099 (emphasis added).
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fairness with the preference for uniformity creates problems when
applying the Rules to pro se litigants.
Another source of difficulty stems from the diverse population of
pro se litigants.43 For the represented litigant, the judge can rely upon a
set of expectations of what the attorney will know. With a pro se litigant,
on the other hand, the judge is likely unaware of how much legal
knowledge any particular pro se litigant has. Thus, it is unclear what
degree of leniency is necessary to permit a fair result for a particular
unrepresented party.44
The Alaska Supreme Court has addressed this consideration by
requiring pro se litigants to educate themselves during their case.45 The
pro se litigant has a duty to attempt to comply with the Rules of Civil
Procedure.46 In reviewing pro se cases, the Alaska Supreme Court
regularly considers the degree to which the unrepresented litigant has
participated in hearings.47 Those pro se litigants who are engaged in
their case are more likely to receive leniency.48 The degree to which a
litigant must be engaged, however, has recently become much less
clear.49

43. See Jonathan D. Rosenbloom, Exploring Methods to Improve Management
and Fairness in Pro Se Cases: A Study of the Pro Se Docket in the Southern District of
New York, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 305, 319–61 (2002) (analyzing the parties, cases,
and claims made in the federal pro se docket in the Southern District of New
York and finding a diversity of parties).
44. In McCracken v. State, the court found “the trial judge should satisfy
himself that the prisoner understands precisely what he is giving up by
declining the assistance of counsel.” 518 P.2d 85, 91 (Alaska 1974).
45. See Kaiser v. Sakata, 40 P.3d 800, 803 (Alaska 2002) (“The litigant is
expected to make a good faith effort to comply with judicial procedures.”); see
also Coffland v. Coffland, 4 P.3d 317, 321 (Alaska 2000) (“A pro se litigant must
make some attempt with the court’s procedures before receiving the benefit of
the court’s leniency.”).
46. Id.
47. See Coffland, 4 P.3d at 320 (finding the trial judge only entered sanctions
after the pro se litigant “demonstrated an unwillingness to cooperate” by not
responding to motions, filing documents in a timely manner, and failing to
appear at pretrial proceedings).
48. Compare Genaro v. Municipality of Anchorage, 76 P.3d 844, 845–47
(Alaska 2003) (allowing the pro se litigant procedural leniency in part because of
her good faith attempt at procedural compliance), with Coffland, 4 P.3d at 321
(denying the pro se litigant procedural leniency because he made no effort to
comply with the court rules and procedure).
49. See Wagner v. Wagner, 299 P.3d 170, 173–74 (Alaska 2013) (finding that a
telephone request amounted to an implied request for continuance). But see
Greenway v. Heathcott, 294 P.3d 1056, 1070 (Alaska 2013) (finding that repeated
expressions of concern did not constitute a request for continuance).

ANDREWS_V12_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

196

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

11/27/2013 1:49 PM

VOL. 30:2

III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRO SE LENIENCY POLICY IN ALASKA
The judicial policy of granting leniency to pro se litigants has a long
history and first emerged at the federal level as early as the 1940s.50 The
modern expression of this policy, however, began in 1972 with Haines v.
Kerner.51 In Haines, the federal district court dismissed a prisoner’s pro se
complaint without allowing him an opportunity to present evidence.52
In reversing the judgment, the United States Supreme Court held that
the allegations, “however inartfully pleaded,” were sufficient to raise a
claim.53 The Court further stated:
We cannot say with assurance that under the allegations of the
pro se complaint, which we hold to less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, it appears “beyond
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of
his claim which would entitle him to relief.”54
Haines did not cite a source for its pronouncement of a less
stringent standard for the pleadings of pro se litigants, and neither did it
rest its result on the United States Constitution, the United States Code,
or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Instead, Haines rested on
nothing but itself to create the foundation for the modern expression of
the policy and its peculiar place in the law.
In 1974, two years after Haines, the Alaska Supreme Court found a
constitutional right to self-representation in McCracken v. State.55 Though
the court did not expressly extend McCracken to require leniency toward
pro se civil litigants under due process, the Alaska Supreme Court
adopted a set of policies that favor the pro se litigant in its decision in
Breck v. Ulmer.56
In Breck, after filing a response to the defendants’ answer, the pro se
plaintiff learned that a reply pleading requires leave of court and
subsequently filed a motion for such leave.57 The motion was denied by

50. See Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774, 775–76 (2d Cir. 1944) (finding a
pro se litigant’s inartfully pleaded complaint was sufficient to withstand
dismissal on the face of the complaint).
51. 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (per curiam).
52. Id. at 520.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 521 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957)). The
United States Supreme Court has since modified the “no set of facts” provision
in Conley. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). The Alaska
Supreme Court has yet to address the modification.
55. McCracken v. State, 518 P.2d 85 (Alaska 1974).
56. 745 P.2d 66 (Alaska 1987).
57. Id. at 69.
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the lower court.58 While the Alaska Supreme Court upheld this denial,
finding that the district court had not abused its discretion and that any
error to the litigant was not prejudicial, the court did agree that more
leniency should have been afforded to the pro se litigant.59
Breck established two standards of leniency for pro se litigants.
First, “the pleadings of pro se litigants should be held to less stringent
standards than those of lawyers.”60 Second, “the trial judge should
inform a pro se litigant of the proper procedure for the action he or she is
obviously attempting to accomplish.”61 Breck did not cite the Alaska
Constitution or due process as the source of a judicial duty to advise pro
se litigants, nor did it cite to McCracken for a constitutional right of selfrepresentation. Similarly, Haines did not cite to the United States
Constitution or consider due process concerns. Though pro se litigants
have occasionally claimed a violation of due process as the source of
trial court error,62 even when reversing the trial court, the Alaska
Supreme Court has never stated that the Due Process Clause protects the
actions of unrepresented litigants.63
Since Breck, the court has modified its leniency policy to account for
the variances in pro se cases. These modifications have reflected the
court’s notion that pro se leniency is rooted in a sense of fairness. A pro
se litigant must still meet some minimum level of competency before the
court allows for procedural leniency.
For example, in Bauman v. State, Division of Family & Youth
Services,64 the court created a “common knowledge” exception to the
rule of leniency.65 In Bauman, the plaintiffs, appearing pro se, did not
oppose the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.66 After the
motion was granted, the plaintiffs argued that they should have been
notified of the requirements of the summary judgment procedure.67
While acknowledging the notion of leniency established in Breck, the
58. Id.
59. Id. at 75.
60. Id. (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)).
61. Id.
62. E.g., Berry v. Berry, 277 P.3d 771, 774 (Alaska 2012); Willoya v. State,
Dep’t of Corr., 53 P.3d 1115, 1124 (Alaska 2002).
63. See, e.g., Wagner v. Wagner, 299 P.3d 170, 174 (Alaska 2013) (basing the
reversal of the trial court on the leniency afforded to pro se litigants and the
court’s failure to inform the litigant of the proper procedure); Genaro v.
Municipality of Anchorage, 76 P.3d 844 (Alaska 2003) (basing the reversal of the
trial court on the court’s failure to advise a pro se litigant on the proper
procedure).
64. 768 P.2d 1097 (Alaska 1989).
65. Id. at 1099.
66. Id. at 1098.
67. Id.
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court was unwilling to extend this leniency when the plaintiffs did not
even file a defective pleading.68 The failure of the pro se litigant in
Bauman fell below the level of competency that the trial court should
expect of a pro se party. In recognizing that it is “common knowledge
that initiating and pursuing a civil lawsuit can be a difficult and
complex procedure,” the court established a minimum “common
knowledge” threshold for pro se litigants to meet.69 In order to meet this
threshold, it is up to the pro se litigant to “familiarize himself or herself
with the rules of procedure.”70
Since Bauman, the court has continued to require some minimum
compliance with the Rules of Civil Procedure. First, when the pro se
litigant is aware of the correct procedures, the trial court has no duty to
advise the litigant further.71 Second, in Coffland v. Coffland,72 the court
held that “[a] pro se litigant must make some attempt to comply with
the court’s procedures before receiving the benefit of the court’s
leniency.”73
In Coffland, the pro se litigant repeatedly ignored discovery
requests and motions, never made an effort to comply with the court’s
procedures, and never asked for the court’s assistance.74 The litigant’s
failure to comply with procedures did not meet the expected minimum
level of competency. In subsequent cases, this standard has been
expressed as requiring “a good faith” attempt to comply.75 Genaro v.
Municipality of Anchorage,76 decided in 2003, is one of the few cases
where the Alaska Supreme Court has applied the Breck standard,
holding that the trial court did not meet it. The court remanded the case
because the trial court failed to adequately advise a pro se litigant.77
Before Genaro, in order to receive leniency, a pro se litigant had to
affirmatively ask for help78 or file an obviously defective pleading.79

68. Id. at 1099.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Willoya v. State, Dep’t of Corr., 53 P.3d 1115, 1123 (Alaska 2002).
72. 4 P.3d 317 (Alaska 2000).
73. Id. at 321.
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., Kaiser v. Sakata, 40 P.3d 800, 804 (Alaska 2002) (holding that if a
pro se litigant does not make a good faith effort to comply with the procedural
rules a court may deny procedural leniency).
76. 76 P.3d 844 (Alaska 2003).
77. Id. at 847.
78. See Coffland, 4 P.3d at 321 (Alaska 2000) (noting that the pro se litigant
never asked for assistance in complying with the court’s orders and therefore
refusing to grant him leniency).
79. See Bauman v. State, Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 768 P.2d 1097, 1099
(Alaska 1989) (refusing to extend pro se leniency to a situation in which the
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Genaro, however, expanded a trial court’s duty to advise a pro se litigant
even when no proper pleading has been filed, as long as the litigant’s
intent is obvious.80
Genaro rests on the unrepresented party’s determined, if somewhat
misplaced, efforts to litigate her case. After Genaro filed suit, a
bankruptcy trustee was briefly given responsibility for her case.81 Once
Genaro had been reinstated as plaintiff, the defendant sent Genaro
requests for admissions which Genaro never answered.82 The defendant
was granted summary judgment over Genaro’s objection that the
bankruptcy trustee had responded to the requests.83 The court held the
requests were admitted due to Genaro’s failure to respond.84
In reversing the lower court’s decision, the Alaska Supreme Court
held that even though Genaro never asked the superior court how to
withdraw statements deemed admitted, Genaro’s efforts in opposing
and objecting to the defendant’s motion were a signal to the trial court
that she was attempting to withdraw the admissions.85
Relying on Breck, Bauman, and Coffland, the Genaro court held that a
trial court has a duty to advise. The court found that “it was an abuse of
discretion not to inform Genaro of the proper procedure for the
action . . . she [was] obviously attempting to accomplish.”86 The court
took note of the technical nature of the Rules of Civil Procedure, in
effect, finding that the particular procedure of withdrawing admitted
statements was outside the common knowledge of what a litigant
should be expected to know.87
Genaro also began to define the scope of judicial neutrality. The
court found that providing advice to a pro se litigant does not require
“open-ended participation by the court [that] would be difficult to
contain.”88 Similarly, the court found that informing the litigant of the
“technical defects” in any pro se pleadings does not “compromise the
superior court’s impartiality.”89 Genaro’s affirmation of the duty to
advise, then, also suggests the limits of such duty. Any leniency that

plaintiffs did not file a defective pleading).
80. Genaro, 76 P.3d at 846.
81. Id. at 845.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 846.
86. Id. at 847 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
87. See id. at 846 (“[T]he rules of court may be models of clarity to one
schooled in the law, [but] a pro se litigant might not find them so.”) (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
88. Id. at 847 (quoting Bauman, 768 P.2d at 1099).
89. Id.
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would compromise the court’s impartiality should not be granted.
Following Genaro, the Alaska Supreme Court continued to expand
Breck. In 2012, in Berry v. Berry,90 a pro se litigant argued that the
superior court violated his due process rights by ordering an accelerated
briefing schedule outside of the normal procedural rules.91 While the
court did not reach the merits of the issue, the court cautioned in dicta:
“[I]t would have been preferable for the court to explain in greater detail
to this pro se litigant the consequences of accelerating the schedule.”92
Thus, the court continued to emphasize the importance of providing
leniency to pro se litigants.

IV. GREENWAY AND WAGNER CREATE AN UNCERTAIN
FUTURE FOR THE ALASKA POLICY OF PRO SE LENIENCY
A. Greenway and Wagner: The Alaska Policy of Leniency Loses
Clarity
In 2013, two cases significantly affected Breck: Greenway v.
Heathcott93 and Wagner v. Wagner.94 Both cases decided what actions by a
pro se litigant constitute a motion that the trial court must recognize.
While both litigants failed to comply with court rules, the litigant in
Greenway lost and the litigant in Wagner won. Together, the two
conflicting opinions compromise the overall clarity of Breck.
Furthermore, Wagner’s expansion of Breck promises difficulties for the
trial bench, for attorneys who face unrepresented parties, and for the
parties themselves.
In Greenway, the pro se litigant frequently expressed her concern
about the absence of a witness and the need for that person’s testimony.
Despite this, the court held these expressions did not constitute a request
for continuance.95 Her attempt to call a government agent as a witness
was unsuccessful, as the United States quashed Greenway’s subpoena.96
On appeal, Greenway argued that the trial court should have granted
her a continuance so that she could obtain the testimony of the witness
and that the court should have inferred a request for relief by her
“repeated exclamations” that the specific witness was needed.97
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277 P.3d 771 (Alaska 2012).
Id. at 774.
Id. at 775 n.11.
294 P.3d 1056 (Alaska 2013).
299 P.3d 170 (Alaska 2013).
Greenway, 294 P.3d at 1070.
Id. at 1060–61.
Id. at 1070.
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In finding there was no formal continuance request, the court
considered whether Greenway’s actions “conveyed an informal request
that should have put the court on notice” that she wanted a
continuance.98 Effectively applying the “common knowledge” rule of
Bauman,99 the court observed that such a request is not “inherently
complex.”100 In fact, Greenway had made similar continuance requests
in the past.101 Ultimately, the court determined that “[n]either her actual
words nor the tenor of her comments put the court on notice that
Greenway was asking for relief, rather than expressing
disappointment.”102
Given Breck, it is not clear why Greenway’s actions were not
accepted as a continuance request. Under Breck, the trial court should
“inform a pro se litigant of the proper procedure for the action he or she
is obviously attempting to accomplish.”103 Later cases, including Genaro,
reiterated the court’s affirmative role.104 It is unclear why Greenway’s
“repeated exclamations” of her concerns were insufficient to show her
intent. Even assuming her remarks were only expressions of
disappointment,105 Greenway’s remarks, combined with her
unsuccessful attempt to subpoena the federal witness,106 should have
made plain what she was “obviously attempting to accomplish.”107
A few weeks later after Greenway was decided, Wagner held that a
telephoned request asking for continuance the day before trial, while not
the proper procedure, could constitute a legitimate continuance request
when the procedural error might have resulted from trial court error.108
In Wagner, a pro se litigant telephoned the court clerk the day before
trial to say that he could not appear.109 The trial court did not inform
Wagner that his method of requesting a continuance by telephone call
was improper, even though Wagner had used this method twice

98. Id.
99. Bauman v. State, Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 768 P.2d 1097, 1099
(Alaska 1989).
100. Greenway, 294 P.3d at 1070.
101. Id. at 1071.
102. Id. at 1070.
103. Breck v. Ulmer, 745 P.2d 66, 75 (Alaska 1987).
104. See, e.g., Genaro v. Municipality of Anchorage, 76 P.3d 844, 847 (Alaska
2003) (holding that the court should have informed the pro se litigant of the
proper procedure for the withdrawal of admissions when the litigant clearly
indicated the desire to do so).
105. Greenway, 294 P.3d at 1070.
106. Id.
107. Breck, 745 P.2d at 75; Genaro, 76 P.3d at 846.
108. Wagner v. Wagner, 299 P.3d 170, 174 (Alaska 2013).
109. Id. at 172.
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before.110 The court ruled that his absence was voluntary, denied a
continuance, and held the trial without Wagner.111 On appeal, the legal
question was whether Wagner’s actions constituted a motion that the
court should have considered.112
Ultimately, the Alaska Supreme Court determined that the motion
should have been considered.113 The court concluded that his “phone
call the day before trial and his failure to file a motion or submit an
affidavit as required by Civil Rule 40(e) constitute a lack of familiarity
with the rules rather than gross neglect or lack of good faith.”114
The court found that three factors supported this conclusion. The
first was established under Breck: “the relaxed standards for pro se
litigants.”115 The second and third factors created the new duties of the
trial court: the litigant “may have reasonably concluded that his earlier
telephonic requests for continuances to the judicial assistant were
acceptable”116 and he “was never ordered to cease calling for
continuances and advised that he needed to file a motion for
continuance.”117 Thus, his telephone call constituted a “legitimate
request for a continuance.”118 Wagner greatly expanded the leniency
granted to the pro se litigant. Today, the trial court must consider
whether its own silence might have left a misimpression in the mind of
the pro se litigant about proper procedure, and must consider pleadings
with defects that may have arisen out of such misimpressions.
This creates a low threshold before the court has some duty to
consider an implied motion. This duty may arise if the pro se litigant
“may have reasonably concluded” that a procedure was correct.119 Once
a duty has arisen, the trial court must analyze the history and impact of
its own actions to assure that it might not have given the unrepresented
person the wrong impression.120
Although the outcome in Wagner differed from the recent decision
in Greenway, only Justice Winfree dissented in Wagner:
The court today . . . apparently add[s] another rule for

110. Id. at 173.
111. Id. at 172–73.
112. Id. at 173.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 174 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. Note that an actual erroneous conclusion is unnecessary. The
reasonable probability of an erroneous conclusion suffices.
120. Id.
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dealing with pro se litigants—implicit in today’s
decision is a rule that a trial court must issue written
orders explaining substantive rulings and procedural
requirements to pro se litigants who decline both to
attend a scheduled court hearing and to make an effort
to determine what occurred at the hearing.121
Justice Winfree was likely correct in his assessment of the impact of the
Wagner ruling. Among other things, the Alaska Supreme Court includes
considerations of judicial efficiency when determining the degree of
flexibility that the court provides to an unrepresented litigant.122
Although the caseload of the Alaska trial bench has remained
remarkably constant in recent years,123 the new affirmative duties under
Wagner might further strain judicial resources. In Wagner, the court
found an implied motion where the litigant had routinely failed to
appear in court.124 This type of hand-holding for litigants who are not
engaged in their own cases could be detrimental to the adversary system
and the impartiality of the court.
B. An Uncertain Future for Pro Se Leniency after Greenway and
Wagner
Greenway and Wagner muddy waters that were clear under Breck,
and today, the usefulness of Breck is less certain.
A due process analysis that recognized a protected interest in selfrepresentation would have been the better tool to resolve these two
cases, especially Wagner. A due process analysis would balance the
constitutionally protected interests of both parties.125 The first element
examines the nature of the private interest.126 The second element
analyzes the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that interest and the
necessity of additional safeguards to protect it.127 In Wagner, as both
litigants appeared pro se, the two parties each held a protected interest

121. Id. at 178 n.1 (Winfree, J. dissenting) (citation omitted).
122. Shooshnian v. Dire, 237 P.3d 618, 624 (Alaska 2010).
123. RYAN FORTSON & BRAD A. MYRSTOL, ALASKA JUSTICE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
CTR., UNIV. OF ALASKA ANCHORAGE, ALASKA TRIAL COURT CASE FILING STATISTICS,
2005-2012, (Apr. 2013), http://justice.uaa.alaska.edu/ajsac/2013/ajsac.1304.trial_courts.pdf.
124. Wagner, 299 P.3d at 174.
125. See In re Urie, 617 P.2d 505, 508 (Alaska 1980) (citations omitted)
(detailing the factors used to establish whether due process scrutiny has been
satisfied).
126. Id. at 508.
127. Id.
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in self-representation. The interests of one would have been affected by
any remedy granted to the other. Under due process, the plaintiff’s
rights would have properly been considered alongside the defendant’s.
The third element of the due process analysis is the interest of the
State.128 In Wagner, the State’s interest was maintaining an impartial and
efficient judicial system. Thus, under due process analysis, the extensive
affirmative duty created in Wagner imposes a heavy burden on the trial
judge, who must preserve the impartiality of the court.129
Prior to Wagner, under Breck and cases that followed, the trial court
would listen to the unrepresented litigant or read the pleadings, then
advise the litigant of any defects, and allow the opportunity to cure.
Wagner changed that practice. Today the trial court must consider
whether its own silence might be the source of the litigant’s error.130 The
judge must estimate what the litigant could have been thinking—not
necessarily what the litigant actually thought. The prior decision in
Greenway complicates the Wagner holding: the litigant’s energetic
behavior might constitute no more than an “expression” that has not yet
solidified into a “motion.”131 If the trial court considers a motion the
litigants did not intend, the court risks unfairness to the opposing party.
The lawyer who represents the opposing party faces related
problems which affect the lawyer’s duty to zealously advocate for her
own client’s position.132 In Wagner, a risk of mischaracterization was
found the day of trial.133 If the lawyer suspects that the court might have
left an opposing pro se litigant with the wrong impression, the client’s
case might be delayed if the misimpression is discovered late in the
proceedings. While not wanting the case to be delayed, the lawyer is
hard-pressed to contact the unrepresented opponent, for fear of alerting
the opponent to issues that might have not occurred to him.

CONCLUSION
Recognizing a protected interest in representing oneself is essential
to preserving a workable policy of leniency toward pro se litigants. The
judicial policy that favors leniency toward pro se litigants plays a
valuable role in assuring access to the courts and the resolution of
disputes on their merits. However, the policy must be anchored to
something secure. At present, the policy lacks this security and thus is
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id.
ALASKA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2, 3 (2012).
Wagner v. Wagner, 299 P.3d 170, 174 (Alaska 2013).
Greenway v. Heathcott, 294 P.3d 1056, 1070 (Alaska 2013).
ALASKA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. § 2 (2012).
Wagner, 299 P.3d at 174.
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vulnerable to nominal flexibility and arbitrariness.
Given the different results in Greenway and Wagner, the current
policy of leniency has little predictive value, thus depriving the trial
court of guidance as to what procedures it must follow, and depriving
the parties of notice about what they may reasonably expect. Tethering
pro se leniency to due process will play an important role in promoting
a coherent, consistent, and useful policy toward the unrepresented
litigant.

